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By WALTER J. DERENBERG t
THE present Federal Trade-Mark Act,' passed almost fort- years ago,
no longer reflects developments in the law of trade-marks and unfair
competition. When the Act was passed in 1905, the prevailing theory
was that any federal registration statute had to be limited to mere pro-
cedural provisions which would in no material way enlarge or impair
existing common law rights. Because the United States Supreme Court
had ruled in the Trade-Mark Cases2 that Congressional authority to legis-
late on the subject of trade-marks had to be found in the commerce clause
of the Constitution, it did not seem possible to vest a registered trade-
mark with any legal benefits which might conflict with the common law
prevailing in the various states. It was, therefore, provided in the Act
that nothing therein should "prevent, lessen, impeach or avoid any remedy
at law or in equity which any party aggrieved by any wrongful use of
any trade mark might have had if the provisions of . . . [the act] had
not been passed." I Thus the common law doctrine of priority of adop-
tion and use as the sole foundation for the acquisition and scope of sub-
stantive rights in trade-marks was left intact; and any thought of grant-
ing the owner of a common law trade-mark substantive statutory rights
independent of his common law rights was discarded. The Supreme
Court and other courts have repeatedly enunciated the doctrine that regis-
tration under the Act of 1905 is but a procedural record of a claim of
ownership previously acquired by adoption and use. And the Supreme
Court has observed on at least three different occasions that Congress has
not been given power to legislate on the substantive law of trade-marks.4
Today, with the tremendous development in modern methods of selling
and advertising, trade-mark protection has become a matter of national
concern affecting interstate commerce even where a trade-mark may be
used predominantly within the boundaries of only a few states, and se-
curity of business and commerce demand the establishment of more effec-
tive statutory safeguards and protection. Moreover, the common law
principles of trade-mark protection and unfair competition have progressed
rapidly, while the Act of 1905 has remained stagnate within its narrow
constitutional frame affording a maximum statutory protection far less
effective than that conferred by the modern principles which the courts
' Office of the General Counsel, Office of Price Administration, on leave from Neew
York University Law School, United States Trade-Mark Association.
1. 33 STAT. 724 (1905), 15 U. S. C. §§81-109 (1940).
2. 100 U. S. 82 (1879).
3. 33 STAT. 724 (1905), 15 U. S. C. § 103 (1940).
4. See American Trading Company v. H. E. Heacock Co., 25 U. S. 247, 256
(1932); American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U. S. 372, 381 (1926); Beckwith
v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U. S. 538, 543 (1920).
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have developed.' In view of these changes, then, it is not surprising that
during the last twenty years efforts have been made to obtain new legis-
lation which would take into account modern trends and broaden the
basis and scope of trade-mark registration. After many years of pre-
liminary work and Congressional hearings it appeared likely in 1940 that
the Seventy-Sixth Congress would finally pass a new trade-mark act,
commonly called the "Lanham Bill," which attempted to grant substantive
rights to the owner of a federally registered trade-mark and sought to
bring the statute into harmony with the more liberal and flexible prin-
ciples of the common law.' However, after the Lanham Bill I passed the
House and the Senate, a motion for reconsideration was made in the Sen-
ate,' and the bill died with the passing of the Seventy-Sixth Congress.
In the Seventy-Seventh Congress the Bill was reintroduced by Con-
gressman Lanham ' and by Senator Bone."° The Senate passed the Bill
on September 17, 1941 ;" and on September 24, 1942, the Bill passed
the House 12 with numerous amendments. It was then referred back to
the Senate Committee on Patents. A subcommittee was appointed, held
hearings on the Bill as amended and subsequently proposed its passage.Y
But the Senate did not accept the subcommittee's report. Upon motion of
the minority leader, Senator McNary, the matter was referred back to the
Senate Committee for further consideration, and the Bill died a few days
later upon adjournment of the Seventy-Seventh Congress.14
5. See H. R. REP. No. 603, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 4: "... ideas concern-
ing trade-mark protection have changed in the last 30 years and the statutes have not
kept pace with the commercial development."
6. In reporting H. R. 82, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) (hereinafter cited as the
Lanham Bill), out on June 25, 1943, Congressman Lanham clearly stated the object of
the Bill: "The purpose of this bill is to place all matters relating to trade-marks in one
statute and to eliminate judicial obscurity, to simplify registration and to make it stronger
and more liberal, to dispense with mere technical prohibitions and arbitrary provisions,
to make procedure simple and inexpensive, and relief against infringement prompt and
effective. This bill effects this necessary codification and coordination." H. R. REr. No,
603, supra note 5, at 2. The report also states the change in theory behind the proposed
Bill: ". . . trade is no longer local, but is national. . . . It would seem as if national
legislation along national lines securing to the owners of trade-marks in interstate com-
merce definite rights should be enacted and should be enacted now." Id. at 5.
7. H. R. 6618, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) ; see 84 CoxN. REc. 9302-07 (1939).
8. 86 CoNG. Rsc. 8988-93 (1940).
9. H. R. 102, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
10. S. 895, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
11. 87 CoNG. REc. 7445-50 (1941).
12. 88 CONG. REc. 7431-37 (1942).
13. The subcommittee was appointed December 11, 1942. The motion for passage of
the Bill was made December 15, 1942.
14. For a more detailed history of these developments, see The Lanham Bill again
before the Senate Committee on Patents (1942) 32 T. M. REP. (Pt. 1) 122; The Lanham
Bill, S. 895 (1943) 33 T. M. REP. (Pt. 1) 10. The discussions on the floor of the Senate
in December, 1942, appear in 88 Cong. Rec., Dec. 15, 1943, at 9893-95.
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The Seventy-Eighth Congress now in session has not yet taken final
action on the Bill, which was reintroduced by Congressman Lanham on
January 6, 1943,1" passed the House in June 1943, and is at present
before the Senate Committee.
In the light of these disappointing Congressional developments it
is not unnatural that trade-mark owners and lawyers have sought "judicial
legislation." And the impressive line of leading Supreme Court decisions
in the past undoubtedly served as an incentive to the trade-mark profession
to submit important moot problems to the Supreme Court."C Unfor-
tunately, trade-mark owners have fared no better with "judicial legis-
lation" in the last two or three years than they did in their efforts to se-
cure Congressional action. The Supreme Court has indicated a certain
degree of indifference toward trade-mark problems and has left this
branch of the law in a state of incongruity and uncertainty which has
been pungently described as "fog and fiction." 
1
7
A glance through recent decisions of the Court reveals that-apart
from one per curiam decision on an issue of proper pleading of local
law in a trade-mark infringement suit '--the Court has granted cer-
tiorari in only one trade-mark case, which involved the proper measure
of damages and profits for trade-mark infringement and unfair com-
petition."0 In all other instances, of which there have been a substantial
number, the doors of the Court have remained closed to a review of
basic questions of trade-mark law. Not since the Court's decisions in the
Shredded Wheat case 2' and the Na-Enamel case 21 in 1938, has the
trade-mark profession had the benefit of an authoritative determination
by the Supreme Court of any of the many controversial issues which
have vexed trade-mark owners and trade-nmark lawyers ever since the
passage of the Act of 1905.
It would be merely conjectural and serve no useful purpose to inquire
into the reasons for the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in all but one
15. A subcommittee held hearings on the Bill April 7 and April 3, 1943, in order to
consider additional amendments.
16. Mr. justice Holmes clearly recognized the peculiar needs of trade-mark owners
in 1923: "It [the trade-mark monopoly] deals with a delicate matter that may be of
great value but that is easily destroyed, and, therefore, should be protected with cor-
responding care." BourJois v. Katzel, 260 U. S. 6S9, 692 (1923).
17. Schechter, Fog and Fiction in Trade-Marl Protection (1936) 36 Co. L Rnv. C9.
18. Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U. S. 666 (1942); cf. Arrow
Distilleries, Inc. v. Arrow Distilleries, Inc., 117 F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941), cert.
denied, 314 U. S. 633 (1941). The decision in this case dealt with the extent of reviev;
by the federal courts of a master's report and findings. While the master's report con-
cerned an issue of trade-mark infringement, no question of trade-mark law was submitted
to the Supreme Court.
19. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Co. v. Kresge Co., 316 U. S. 203 (1942).
20. Kellogg v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. Ill (1938).
21. Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 3U5 U. S. 315 (1933).
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of these recent trade-mark cases. 2 Possibly, the Court was guided by the
consideration that the controversies did not involve issues of sufficient
general public interest to justify final review in times of war and economic
emergency. Disputes between two trade-mark applicants or owners con-
cerning their respective rights to protection or registration do not, at first
blush, seem to present substantial federal questions even though millions
of dollars may be involved. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it becomes
apparent that most of the cases involve important principles of statu-
tory interpretation and common law rights which well deserve and de-
mand final determination in order to aid the business world in building up
and preserving commercial goodwill. A final review would also con-
tribute towards speedier enactment of new legislation by clarifying some
decades-old controversial issues which until now have blocked, or at least
impaired, the passage of new federal trade-mark legislation. The fol-
lowing illustrative cases upon which the Supreme Court refused to pass
in 1942 and 1943 bring to the fore the manifold ambiguities and dangers
which threaten trade-marks from the time of their adoption until their
often involuntary and unexpected loss.
I.
About a year ago, the Supreme Court refused to review the question,
involved in the Dixi-Cola case,23 of whether a trade-mark or a part there-
of may be lost merely through public acclain or public usage despite "a
vigorous fight" by the owner to preserve his right.24 By invalidating the
22. 'Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Co. v. Kresge Co., 316 U. S. 203 (1942).
23. Dixi-Cola Labs. v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F. (2d) 352 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941), cerl,
denied, 314 U. S. 629 (1941).
24. The immediate result of the Court's denial of certiorari has been a prolonged attd
still unsettled controversy over section 33 (b) (4) of the Lanham Bill. The recent hear-
ings of April 7-8, 1943, were devoted almost exclusively to this question. Section 33(b) (4)
makes it a defense t6 incontestability to prove "that the use by the defendant of the name,
term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a trade or ser-
vice mark, of the defendant's individual name in his own business, or of the individual
name of anyone in privity with the defendant, or of a term or device which is descriptive
of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe to users the goods or services of the
defendant, or their geographic origin. . . ." (italics added). Those opposed to the
passage of the Bill in its present form pointed out at the hearings that the language of this
section covers descriptive terms only and not names which have become generic. The
suggestion was made that the section be worded: "That the use by the defendant of the
name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a commercially fair use, made in
a manner not calculated to confuse the public of the defendant's individual name in his
own business, or of the individual name or anyone in privity with the defendant who uses
his own name in his own business, or of a descriptive, generic, or geographical term
or device." Hearings before the House Committee on Patents on H. R. 82, 78th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1943) 22. The sponsors of the Bill took the position that section 45, the aban-
donment section of the act, dealt with this matter which provides that there shall be no
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Shredded Wheat 2 trade-mark and by refusing to review the Cellophane
case,2 1 in which the word "cellophane" was declared publici juris by a
court of appeals, the Supreme Court had previously indicated that a trade-
mark once valid may be lost upon becoming a generic term. But these
cases did not decide whether a trade-mark may be lost solely because of
public acclaim in the absence of any fault on the part of its owner; for
in both cases the trade-mark owners had contributed to, if not actually
encouraged, a generic use by the public and the trade of the terms involved.
As a result of the denial of certiorari in the Dixi-Cola case, trade-mark
owners will have to be cautioned against popularizing their marks to such
an extent that - to paraphrase 'Mr. justice Brandeis' opinion in the
Shredded rVheat case-their primary significance to the public is nut
the producer but the product itself. MIay too much success and too much
popularity alone lead to sudden and unexpected loss of a trade-mark's
distinctiveness and-as a result- of the trade-mark itself? We will not
know the answer until the Supreme Court reviews a case in which a mark
or a part thereof is declared forfeited to the public solely because of a
gradual transition of an initially valid trade-mark into the public domain
and into the realm of free "generic" terms.
II.
The Supreme Court's decision in the Nu-Enamel case 27 in 1938 authori-
tatively defined the rights of the owner of a trade-mark registered under
the Act of 1920 and stated the full implications of the "secondary mean-
ing" doctrine. The essence of the doctrine is that an originally defective
trade-mark loses its infirmity and becomes entitled to protection as a trade-
mark when it acquires a primary trade-mark significance. Since the de-
fendant in the Nu-Enamel case conceded that the mark "Nu-Enamel" had
acquired a secondary meaning, the Court was not asked to determine by
how large a part of the general public a name must come to be associated
with the oxvner's business before it will deserve trade-mark protection at
common law.28
But this precise question had been squarely presented to the Court by
the petition for certiorari in the Brake Block case - which was denied
in 1942. The Second Circuit of Appeals had observed:
loss of a trade-mark without some fault (act of "comission" or "omission") on the owner's
part.
25. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111 (1938).
26. E. T. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 299 U. S. 601 (1936),
decision rendered, 85 F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
27. Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U. S. 315 (1938).
28. Id. at 320-21.
29. American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Alltex Products Corp., 117 F. (2d)
983 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 631 (1941).
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"At times courts have indeed seemed to assume that the owner of
a secondary [meaning] mark loses if he fails to show that substan-
tially everybody supposes the mark to mean not only what it describes
but that he, or some single maker or seller, is the source of the goods;
but we need not go so far. Arguendo we will assume that if to a sub-
stantial part of the trade, though not by any means to all of it, a
descriptive term has acquired a secondary meaning, competitors may
be required to distinguish their wares in some way that will not
impose upon them a disproportionally heavy burden. It is proper
enough to protect a business though only a part of it is hurt; that
accords with the principle which constitutes the whole law of the
subject." 30
The court had held, however, that even if a secondary meaning for the
words "Brake Block" had been established, the plaintiff would not have
been entitled to injunctive relief because not the defendant himself but
those who bought from him used the infringing name "National Brake
Block" for purposes of substitution. The defendant's goods were mar-
keted through dealers who substituted his linings when they knew that
car owners wanted the plaintiff's, and there was evidence that the
defendant's salesmen advised his dealers to make these substitutions.
Under established principles of contributory trade-mark infringement,
this showing should have served as a sufficient basis for enjoining the
defendant from using any direct or indirect means which made such a
fraud possible, including the use of the confusingly similar trade-mark
"National Brake Block." But the court had reasoned that the defendant's
customers-repair shops and service stations-and not the defendant de-
ceived the car owners who expected to get the plaintiff's lining when they
asked for "Brake Block," and had concluded:
"The use of the name can injure the plaintiff only in so far as it
results in mistaken buying by the last buyer who accepts the goods
because of their name, and the owner is not such a buyer. To suc-
ceed, the plaintiff was therefore bound' to show that repair shops
or service stations were deceived, and that it failed to db." 31
In his petition for certiorari the plaintiff stressed the fact that this
holding appears to be in conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in the
Warner case that "one who induces another to commit a fraud, and fur-
nishes the means of consummating it, is equally guilty and liable for the
injury." 32
30. Id. at 984.
31. Id. at 984-85.
32. William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U. S. 526, 530-31 (1924).
See also Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Royal, 122 Fed. 337, 344-45 (C. C. A. 6th, 1903);
N. K. Fairbank Co. v. Luckel, King & Cake Soap Co., 102 Fed. 327, 330-31 (C. C. A.
9th, 1900); N. K. Fairbank Co. v. R. W. Bell Mfg. Co., 77 Fed. 869, 878 (C. C. A.
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The denial of certiorari in the Brake Block case has left the application
of the "secondary meaning doctrine" unsettled and has cast doubt on
the extent to which the doctrine of contributory infringement is applic-
able in trade-mark cases. A gap in the theory of trade-mark protection
has been reopened, which the TVarner case had ostensibly closed. a
III.
By refusing to hear Time, Inc. z,. T'iobin Corporation "' a few months
ago, the Supreme Court lost an opportunity to define the extent of a trade-
mark owner's preEmptive rights. The basic issue in the case was whether
the modern theory of trade-mark protection and unfair competition should
be extended to give the owner of the magazine Life a cause of action
against a cereal manufacturer who used the trade-mark "Life of Wheat"
and a color arrangement similar to that used on the magazine. Here was
an opportunity for the Court to decide the "nice question" it had intended
to determine in the Beech-Nut case in 1927." The late Mr. Justice
2d, 1896); Enoch Morgan's Sons Co. v. Whittier-Coburn Co., 118 Fed. 657, C51
(C. C. N. D. Cal. 1902) ; Von Mumm v. Frash, 56 Fed. 930 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1893).
Contra: Coca-Cola Co. v. Nehi Corp., 25 A. (2d) 364 (1942) (Ch. Dela. 1942). This
case is now pending before the Supreme Court of Delaware. The principle has even Leen
applied in the absence of evidence directly connecting the dishonest dealing with the de-
fendant. In Enoch Mforgan's Sons Co. v. Whittier-Coburn Co., 118 Fed. 657, 061 (C. C.
N. b. Cal. 1902), it was said: "In the present case the evidence shows that the good
of the defendant have been mistaken by purchasers for those of the complainant, proiably
by the design of the dealer. And, though there is no evidence connecting such dishonest
dealing with the defendant in any way, the fact that it so dresses its goods as t, give an
easy opportunity to the unscrupulous dealer to delude the consuming purchaser is very per-
suasive evidence that an intention existed to enter into competition with the manufacturer
whose goods were already well established, and to carry on such competition in a man-
ner which courts of equity hold to be unfair."
33. The doctrine of contributory infringement is embodied in section 32(1) of the
Lanham Bill: "Any person who shall, in commerce, (a) use, without the consent of the
registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of any registered
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising of any goods or cer-
vices on or in connection with such use as is likely to cause cvnfusion or mistake or to
deceive purchasers as to the source or origin of such goods or services; or (b) repru-
duce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate any such mark and apply such reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, package_,, wrappers, re-
ceptacles, or advertisements intended to be used upon or in connection with the sale in
commerce of such goods or services, shall be liable to a civil action by the registrant for
"any or all of the remedies hereinafter provided, except that under subsection (b) herC4f
the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have
been committed with knowledge that such mark is intended to be used to cauce c.,nfu-
sion or mistake or to deceive purchasers."
34. 128 F. (2d) 860 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 673 (1942).
35. Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273 U. S. 629 (19-7). The Supreme
Court had intended to decide the question whether the owner of the well-lhnmwn "Beech-
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Holmes, obviously to his own disappointment, reached the conclusion that
the decision in that case hinged upon an issue of abandonment rather
than on the substantive scope of trade-mark protection. Thus the basic
question of the trade-mark owner's preemptive rights was left unanswered
by the Supreme Court and has remained so to the present day. Although
the Lanham Bill, should it become law, will not settle the question since
the issue involved concerns principles of common law protection against
infringement and unfair competition rather than statutory rights derived
from registration, it should be noted that the test which section 32(1) of
the bill provides for the institution of an infringement action is far more
liberal than that provided in section 16 of the present Act. Section 16
limits the right of action to an infringing use of a trade-mark on mer-
chandise "of the same descriptive properties." Under section 32 of the
proposed Bill an injunction would lie against any use of a trade-mark
which might cause confusion or mistake or might deceive purchasers "as
to the source or origin" of the goods. If confusion as to source could be
established, the owner of a magazine might be entitled to an injunction
under section 32 against use of a colorable imitation of his trade-mark
by the manufacturer of a cereal product.
IV.
By denial of certiorari in the Philadelphia Inquirer case,"o the Supreme
Court left in doubt the proper construction to be given the words "same
descriptive properties" which appear in the Act of 1905 at three different
places.37 A controversy has plagued the trade-mark profession since 1905
as to the proper construction of this language, and neither the members
of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals nor the members of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia have been
able to agree upon the question. Consequently, during the past decade
there has been an impressive and uninterrupted line of dissenting opinions
Nut" trade-mark could enjoin use of that mark for tobacco despite the fact that the use
of the word on tobacco had antedated the first use of the "Beech-Nut" trade-mark by the
Beech-Nut Packing Company.
36. Philadelphia Inquirer Co. v. Coe, 38 F. Supp. 427 (D. D. C. 1941), aff'd, 133 F.
(2d) 385 (App. D. C. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 793 (1943).
37. The proviso in section 5 reads:
"Provided, That the trade-marks which are identical with a registered or known trade-
mark owned and in use by another, and appropriated to merchandise of the same descrip-
tive properties, or which so nearly resemble a registered or known trade-mark owned and
in use by another, and appropriated to merchandise of the same descriptive properties, as
to be likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of the public, or to deceive pur-
chasers, shall not be registered ... " 33 STAT. 724, 725 (1905), 15 U. S. C. § 85(b)
(1940).
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on this point. It was this phrase to which the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals referred in the Del Monte case when it said:
"Thousands of pages have been written by the courts in constru-
ing the last-quoted provision and there are but few statutory phrases
which have produced so much variance and conflict of judicial opin-
ion." 3
It is not, however, the literal meaning of the phrase by itself which
has caused unabating difficulty, but rather its significance in the general
framework of section 5 of the Act providing for trade-mark registration.
The crucial questions are (1) whether registration imst be denied if two
marks are identical and used on merchandise of the same descriptive
properties even in the absence of any confusion or likelihood of con-
fusion and, usually more important, (2) whether registration must )w
granted if the identical mark is used on articles having different descriptive
properties under the technical classification of the Patent Office even if
considerable likelihood of confusion is found to exist despite the different
classification? Ever since the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was
vested with jurisdiction over appeals in trade-mark registration proceed-
ings, there has been a sharp difference of opinion among the court's own
members in regard to both these questions. The majority in a series #of
leading cases developed the so-called "confusion test" first clearly defined
in the Hockineyer " and Del Monte " cases. This doctrine was thus
stated in the latter case:
".. . we think the great weight of authority is to the effect that 'the
dominant purpose of that part of the section here involved is the
prevention of confusion and deception,' and that in determining the
meaning of the phrase 'merchandise of the same descriptive prop-
erties,' controlling consideration must be given to the question as to
whether or not the goods are similar to the extent that confusion,
deception, or mistake will result to the public or to purchasers,
and if the goods are sufficiently similar, that the use of an identical
trade-mark on the goods of both will result in the goods of one be-
ing regarded by the purchaser as the goods of the other, that they are
to be regarded as goods of the same descriptive properties." 4i
38. California Packing Co. v. Tillman & Bendel, 40 F. (2d) 108, 110 (C. C. P. A.
1930). See also the statement of Harry D. Nims in 1929:
"To the lawyer it is the synonym of confusion; to the layman it is meaningless. The
attempts of the Patent Office and of the courts to find a rule of thumb by which to
classify commodities in this respect has been a complete failure, at least from the lay-
man's standpoint." NIss, U-ITvAmR COesPETITION A-m TrADE-MArMS (3d ed. 1929) 525.
39. 3. F. Goodrich Co. v. Clive E. Hocaneyer, 40 F. (2d) 99 (C. C P. A. 1930).
40. California Packing Co. v. Tillman & Bendel, 40 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. P. A.
1930).
41. Id. at 110.
19431
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
While the majority found it necessary to restate and modify this doc-
trine in the Better Homes case 42 in order not to read the words "same
descriptive properties" entirely out of the statute; the court reiterated
there that in order to determine the meaning of the words for pur-
poses of registration, many important external factors must be considered
in conjunction with the application of technical classification tests. Due
weight should be given, for example, to whether the goods are commonly
sold together and whether they are used for the same purpose and by the
same people. In the light of this test the court's decision that cigarettes
and cigarette cases or powder and powder boxes are goods of the same
descriptive properties 43 is easily explained and is clearly justified despite
the fact that the articles are technically "unrelated."
A minority of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has, however,
consistently held that a determination that certain articles technically do
or do not have the same descriptive properties ends the matter as far as
registration is concerned and that if the descriptive properties are the
same, registration should be denied irrespective of the factor of possible
confusion. This minority view, surprisingly enough, was adopted by the
majority of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the
Philadelphia Inquirer case.
The Philadelphia Inquirer sought registration of the mark "Everybody's
Weekly," a name given to the magazine supplement section of its Sunday
newspaper. Registration was opposed and denied because of the existence
of the British publication "Everybody's-the Popular Weekly." On the
inside page of the British publication appeared the heading "Everybody's
Weekly." The examiner as well as the Commissioner of Patents refused
registration. In a proceeding to compel the Commissioner of Patents
to register the mark, the district court 4 held that the goods were of the
same descriptive properties, that the marks were identical, and that,
therefore, external evidence showing complete absence of any actual con-
fusion or likelihood of confusion between the two periodicals was irrele-
vant under the language of section 5 and not admissible. The Court of
Appeals, affirming this ruling, said that the "confusion" test as applied by
the majority of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ignored "the
nicer standards" of the statute. Mr. Justice Stephens in a strong dis-
senting opinion " pointed out that likelihood of confusion should be the
over-all test of registrability and that the words "same descriptive prop-
42. Meredith Publishing Co. v. 0. M. Scott & Sons Co., 88 F. (Zd) 324 (C. C. P.
A. 1937), holding that registration of the words "Better Homes" for lawn grass seed
should be permitted over the objection of the owner of the magazine "Better Homes."
43. See Elgin American Mfg. Co. v. Elizabeth Arden, 83 F. (2d) 681 (C, C. P. A.
1936).
44. Philadelphia Inquirer v. Coe, 38 F. Supp. 427 (D. C. Col. 1941).
45. Philadelphia Inquirer v. Coe, 133 F. (2d) 385, 389 (App. D. C. 1942).
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erties" provide but one statutory factor for determining the likelihood of
confusion. Therefore, he concluded, external evidence intended to show
complete absence of any likelihood of confusion should have been ad-
mitted.
4 6
Trade-mark owners and lawyers alike had hoped that the Supreme
Court would be willing to settle the conflict and authoritatively interpret
the meaning and scope of the phrase "same descriptive properties." Be-
cause of the Court's refusal to review the case, trade-mark attorneys will
remain confronted with the task of guiding applicants and registrants
through a mass of conflicting and irreconcilable court and Patent Office
holdings.
The passage of the Lanham Bill would put an end to this dilemma
because section 2(d) expressly provides that no mark shall be registered
which is likely, when applied to the goods of the applicant, "to cause con-
fusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers." Thus the Bill has clearly
adopted the viewpoint expressed by the majority of the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals and by the dissenting opinion in the Philadelphia
Inquirer case. Moreover, the phrase "same descriptive properties" is elim-
inated entirely from the proposed statute; and despite the opportunity
afforded by endless hearings and discussions of the proposed new Act, no
serious opposition was ever raised to its elimination. This fact indicates
that the soundness of the "confusion" test is almost universally recognized
and that the reasoning of the majority opinion in the Philadelphia In-
quirer case, which is out of line with the more progressive modern trend,
demanded authoritative review by the Supreme Court.
4
46. Judge Stephens said: "I find nothing in the statute or in the authorities which
requires the conclusion that the court, in determining under the second proviso of Sec-
tion 5 whether or not items of merchandise possess the same descriptive properties, must
limit itself to visual inspection of the goods and inferences to be drawn from such inspec-
tion, and ignore likelihood of confusion and the testimony of the trade with respect thereto.
I think this court has ruled that, in the light of the purpose of the trade-mark act-to
protect honest dealers and the public-likelihood of confusion and what the trade thinks
with respect thereto is the critical consideration for determining whether or not the
descriptive properties of items of merchandise are the same." Id. at 393. He also quoted
extensively from judge Learned Hand's opinion in Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson,
26 F. (2d) 972, 974 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), where the following interpretation was made
of the phrase: "'While we ovn that it does some violence to the language, it seems
to us that the phrase should be taken as no more than a recognition that there may be
enough disparity in character between the goods of the first and second users as to i:nsure
against confusion. That will indced depend much upon trade conditions, but thesc are al-
ways the heart of the 2nattcr in this subject.'" Id at 392.
47. In Solventol Chemical Products v. Langfield, 134 F. (2d) S99 (C. C. . 6th, 1943),
registration was sought of the trade-mark "Solventol" for a cleaning preparation. Both the
Patent Office Tribunals and the district court in 41 F. Supp. 877 (E. D. Mich. 1941) sus-
tained the opposition of the owner of the registered trade-mark "Solvite" on the theory
that the articles were practically identical and the two trade-marks confusingly similar.
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V.
Prior to the petition in the Philadelphia Inquirer case, the Supreme
Court also refused to review the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' de-
cision denying registration of the name "Texas Centennial" for a certain
patented variety of rose."' As a result of this denial of certiorari, trade-
mark attorneys asked to advise their clients with regard to the registrability
of variety names of patented articles will find themselves in a precarious
position. The issue in the case was whether the owner of a plant patent
for a new variety of rose should be granted registration of the name
"Texas Centennial," under which he had introduced the rose in com-
merce. He had listed it under that name in his catalogues and attributed
certain physical features to this rose in order to distinguish it from other
roses. The examiner refused registration because "the words 'Texas
Centennial' merely indicated the variety name of a particular rose" and
because registration, if permitted, would "tend to extend a monopoly,"
since the words were "the name of a patented article." '0 A suit to compel
registration was instituted, but both the district court and the court of
appeals affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Patents. The
reasoning of the court of appeals may well be characterized as unheard
of in any proceeding of this kind. That court said:
"The Patent Office and the District Court might properly conclude
that the words 'Texas Centennial,' though originally arbitrary, have
The district court relied on two decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
which sustained the opposition of the owner of the "Solvite" trade-mark against regis-
tration of the terms "Solvit-All" and "Solvoline" for cleaning preparations. The court
of appeals held that although there was "some difference" in the descriptive properties
of the two articles, they had the same "general descriptive properties." Under the test
of the majority decision in the Philadelphia Inquirer case, registration should have been
denied on that ground provided the two marks were either identical or confusingly simi-
lar. The court, however, adopted the "confusion test" as applied by Mr. Justice Stephens
in his dissenting opinion in that case, saying: ". . . in considering the question as to
whether confusion would likely result from the registration of appellant's trade mark, it is
proper to weigh the circumstances under which the goods are and will be sold, together
with the dissimilarity of both the goods and the respective trade marks." Id. at 902.
The opposition was dismissed because of the dissimilarity of the two trade-marks in-
volved, both of which were characterized as weak "suggestive" trade-marks. See note
55 infra. This decision is difficult to reconcile with the majority decision in the Philadel-
phia Inquirer case and shows that at the present time both the selection and protection
of a registered trade-mark are frequently a gamble of the first order. The losing appli-
cant in this case filed a petition for certiorari on July 2, 1943.
48. Dixie Rose Nursery v. Coe, 131' F. (2d) 446 (App. D. C. 1942), cert. denied,
318 U. S. 782 (1943). This case is discussed in a comprehensive article by Green-
berg, The Effect of a Patent-Expiration on Trade-Mark Rights (1943) 35 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc. 564.
49. The Commissioner of Patents, on appeal, affirmed the holding of the Examiner
that registration should be refused because the words "Texas Centennial" were unregis-
trable without a disclaimer of the word "Texas" and the accompanying outline map of
the State of Texas.
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come to describe to the public a rose of a particular sort, not a rose
from a particular nursery. It follows that the statute forbids the
registration of the words, unless an exception is to be read into the
statute to the effect that words which are descriptive may nonethe-
less be registered when the applicant and his licensees are, for the
moment, the only persons who produce the thing described.
"The policy of such an exception is not so clear that we can impute
to Congress an intent to imply it. It is conceived to be fair to per-
suade buyers that they want goods from a particular source, and to
enable them to get such goods by the convenient means that an ex-
clusive trade mark or trade name provides. It is conceived to be un-
fair to require buyers who are indifferent to source, and want merely
goods of certain characteristics, to name a particular source in order
to name the desired characteristics. To allow registration of the
name 'Texas Centennial' would give appellant an unfair advantage,
despite the fact that only appellant and its licensees now produce
Texas Centennials. It would tend to prolong appellant's monopoly,
beyond the life of appellant's patent, by making it difficult for a new-
comer to break into the field. We cannot read such an intent into the
Trade Mark Act." r0
Only a few years ago the patent statute was amended to permit the
grant of patents for new varieties of plants."' The hearings before the
House Committee on Patents in 1930 on the plant patent amendment -
offer eloquent documentary proof of a universal willingness to afford
inventors of new plants or of new varieties of plants the same measure
of protection which industrial inventors enjoy. Despite the fact that sec-
tion 5 of the Act of 1905 in enumerating those t3es of marks which
may not be registered fails even to mention the names of patented articles,
the Te-ras Centennial decision would appear to impose a mandatory duty
upon the Commissioner of Patents to inquire in every case of a trade-
mark application for a new commercial product or variety whether the
article is patented or not and to deny registration if the article is patented
50. Dixie Rose Nursery v. Coe, 131 F. (2d) 446. 447 (App. D. C. 1942).
51. See 46 STAT. 376 (1930), 35 U. S. C. §31 (1940) :
"Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements thercof, or who
has invented or discovered and asexually reproduced any distinct and new variety of plant,
other than a tuber-propagated plant, not known or used by others in this country, before
his invention or discovery thereof, and not patented or described in any printed publica-
tion in this or any foreign country, before his invention or discovery thereof, or more
than one year prior to his application, and not in public use or on -ale in this country
for more than one year prior to this application, unless the same is proved to have bwn
abandoned, may, upon payment of the fees required by law, and other due proceedings
had, obtain a patent therefor."
52. Hearings before the House Committee on Patents on H. R. 11372, 71st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1930).
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solely because after the expiration of the patent the owner of the mark
may want to renew the registration and thus perpetuate his "monopoly."
Thus one important benefit which would ordinarily flow from the grant
of a patent for a new plant variety seems to have been eliminated.
Moreover, all recent court decisions demonstrate that there is no serious
objection to allowing a valid trade-mark to survive beyond the duration
of a patent. It is no longer correct to say that trade-mark rights on pat-
ented articles are automatically lost with the expiration of the patent.6A
It is a question of fact, to be determined in each case at the time of ex-
piration, whether a trade-mark has become the generic name of the article.
Even the classical common law doctrine of the Singer case, "4 which de-
clared every trade-mark automatically publici juris upon expiration of the
patent, was concerned only with the fate of the trade-mark after the patent
expired, and there was not a suggestion in that case that the name of a
patented article necessarily is an invalid trade-mark ab initio.
If the decision in the Texas Centennial case that the mark was invalid
because it referred to a style or class of merchandise were sound law,
literally thousands of marks adopted for different varieties and grades of
commodities, whether they be varieties of roses, biscuits, paint, or soap,
would have to be considered invalid solely because they necessarily refer
to one particular style or type of merchandise. Neither the courts nor
the Patent Office have ever gone that far. On the contrary, it has been
recognized in recent years that the same name may serve both as a grade
mark (or variety mark) and as a trade-mark. Thus the court said in the
Club Cracker case:
"It is, of course, the law that a name, which is used solely to identi-
fy some particular type or grade of goods or to differentiate it from
others of the same manufacturer, will not by such use become a
trade mark. . . . But it is equally well established that where the
intention is to acquire a trade-mark, the mere fact that the name also
serves to designate a particular kind, grade, or quality of article
manufactured does not prevent the creation of a trade-mark right
in it." r5
As recently as January, 1943, the Commissioner of Patents held in
Ex parte Pfister Hybrid Corn Company,"0 that a designation may serve
as a trade-mark and as a grade mark at the same time. Consequently, the
number "5897" was registered for seed corn despite the fact that it was
applied to a particular strain of seed corn. The Commissioner remarked:
53. See DERENBERG, TRADE-MARK PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING (1936) 619 et
seq., and cases cited therein. See also (1936) 5 GEO. WASn. L. REV. 224.
54. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U. S. 169 (1896).
55. Keebler Weyl Baking Co. v. J. S. Ivins Sons, 7 F. Supp. 211, 212 (E. D. Pa,
1934).
56. 56 U. S. PAT. Q. 275 (Cornrn'r of Pat. 1943).
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"It does not appear that anyone else has ever used the numeral
'5897' as a grade mark and it seems to me the mark as used by ap-
plicant conveys true trade mark significance to such an extent that
should purchasers see this mark on seed corn produced and sold by
others than applicant the purchasers would be deceived and misled
into believing the seed corn to be applicant's product." 57
In Ex parte Eastman Kodak Company. s the Commissioner upheld the
validity of the designation "D-11" as a trade-mark for photographic
developers on the ground that such a designation denoted not only type
or quality but was also intended to denote the origin of the goods.
There seems to be no valid reason why the name "Texas Centennial"
-disregarding its other alleged infirmities-for a variety of rose should
be considered less deserving of protection than the name "Uneeda" for
a variety of biscuit or the name "Waterman" for a kind of pen or the
name "B. V. D." for a type of underwear. The fact that during the life-
time of the patent only one manufacturer may lawfully produce the article
would appear to be even more reason for protecting him in the exclusive
use as a trade-mark of the name under which the article is sold because
such a name signifies, at least for the duration of that period, not only the
new article or variety, but also its exclusive producer!m
VI.
The question of the registrability and protection of color designs or of
color alone as trade-marks was also recently submitted to the Supreme
Court but not considered. Over thirty-five years ago in Leschen z. Brod-
erick " the Court enunciated some general rules with respect to the pro-
tection of color trade-marks. In that case the Court indicated by way of
dictum that the validity of a color strand for wire rope might perhaps
be permissible if the application were limited to one color, but that nu
protection could be claimed for all colors by which the article might be
distinguished."
57. Ibid. The Commissioner there said: "... it does not necessarily follow that
merely because a mark serves as a grade mark it may not also be a technical trade mark
under Act of February 20, 1905. Menendez v. Holt, 128 U. S. 514, 1S9, C. D. 344, 46
0. G. 971; Richard Hellman, Inc. v. Oakford and Fahnestock, 19 C. C. P. A. 816, 54 F.
(2d) 423, 1932, C. D. 160."
58. 55 U. S. PAT. Q. 361 (Comm'r of Pat. 1942).
59. The Lanham Bill is silent with regard to the treatment of variety names of
either patented or unpatented articles, but it seems clear by implication from section
2(f) that any such mark may be registered if it is "distinctive of the applicant's goods
in commerce."
60. 201 U. S. 166 (1906).
61. "Even if it were conceded that a person might claim a wire rope colored red or
white, or any other color, it would clearly be too broad to embrace all colors. ". . . and
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The Court added that it was doubtful whether color per se could ever
constitute a technical trade-mark, but that use of a color as part of and
in conjunction with a particular form or stripe such as a cross or a tri-
angle may constitute a trade-mark use. This dictum, instead of settling
the question once and for all, provoked an endless line of conflicting and
inconsistent judicial and administrative rulings, 2 and the question is as
moot and controversial today as it was in 1906 when the case was decided.
In the recent case of James Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire
Works," the lower federal courts denied relief to a manufacturer of fish-
ing tackle whose trade-mark consisted of a narrow red stripe. The goods
for which this mark was registered included fishing rods, artificial baits,
fish floats, fish hooks, and other related articles. The trade-mark in form
of a narrow red stripe was applied on all these items to one or more edges
of the containers or was affixed upon boxes and cartons. It appeared also
in the form of stitching with red thread on the fabric bags containing
fishing rods. Despite the fact that the trial court frankly stated that it
"had no sympathy for the defendant" and "did not like the extent to which
the defendant had copied," both lower courts held that this red edge mark
was "not a trade-mark and . . . [could] not be exclusively appropriated"
and that the mark, although it admittedly indicated the plaintiff's goods
to some members of the public, did "not point out distinctly the origin
or ownership of the articles to which the label [was] affixed." In his peti-
tion for certiorari, 4 the plaintiff emphasized the complete lack of uni-
formity in the decisions of the courts and the Patent Office Tribunals and
the need for final determination by the Supreme Court. He also pointed
out that the Supreme Court in the Mishawaka case 0" had given effect to
a color trade-mark "consisting of a red circular plug embedded in the
center of a heel" and that the decision of the lower courts in the present
case appeared to be inconsistent with that holding. Thus the Supreme
Court was presented with an opportunity to restate the much debated doc-
trine of the Leschen case " in the light of its Mishawaka decision " and
to bring to an end the age-old controversy over the registrability of color
stripes and color designs. Unfortunately, the Court refused to re-examine
the question.
8
a trade-mark which may be infringed by a streak of any color, however applied, is
manifestly too broad." Id. at 171.
62. DERENBERG, op. cit. supra note 53, at 293-303.
63. 128 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 674 (1942).
64. The petitioner stated: "So we have a colored band here upheld, a colored band
there stricken down, a blue handle grip somewhere denied, a red 'Circular plug sustained
by this Court, etc.-all tending to bewilder and confuse those who seek some authoritative
guidance."
65. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Kresge Co., 316 U. S. 203 (1942).
66. 201 U. S. 166 (1906)..
67. 316 U. S. 203 (1942).
68. 317 U. S. 674 (1943).
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VII.
By denying certiorari in the case of John Clayton Cridlebaugh -.. Mater-
ice L. Rudolph,6 9 the Supreme Court refused to clarify the distincti ni
between a valid suggestive and an invalid descriptive mark. That case
involved the validity of the trade-mark "Specs" as applied to a mask for
fowl. The mask, a mechanical device fitted on a chicken's beak, was de-
signed to partially obstruct the chicken's forward vision on a horizontal
plane in order to prevent picking. The lower courts had held that the word
"Specs" was "but a figurative description" of the article and that plaintiff
was entitled, therefore, neither to its exclusive use, nor to protectioin
against the use of the word "Goggles" by the defendant." Thus the de-
cision had hinged upon a determination of the distinction between a valid
suggestive and an invalid descriptive mark.
Courts have not been too successful in establishing a proper line of de-
marcation between descriptive and suggestive marks, and the Supreme
Court has never considered this question. It denied certiorari some years
ago in the prolonged litigation over the validity of the trade-mark "Chick-
en of the Sea" for canned tunafish. A long line of decisions by the Patent
Office Tribunal and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had ad-
judicated this a valid suggestive mark while an equal number of federal
court decisions "' had held the term invalid and descriptive. The best dis-
cussion of the difference between descriptive and suggestive marks is
found in the case W. G. Reardon Laboratories v. B. & B. Externzin-
ators.72 There the term "Mouse Seed" was upheld as a valid suggestive
mark for a rodent exterminator. The court argued:
when the two words are coupled together to make 'AMouse
Seed' there is no immediate meaning conveyed but a suggestion to
69. 131 F. (2d) 795 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 779 (1943).
70. Cridlebaugh v. Rudolph, 40 F. Supp. 393 (D. N. J. 1941).
71. Compare Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. Cohn-Hopkins, 56 F. (2d) 797 (C. C. A.
9th, 1932), cert. denied. 286 U. S. 561 (1932). Not only the definition of a suggestive
trade-mark but also the scope of protection that such mark deserves are in doubt. Ac-
cording to the most recent decision on this point, a suggestive trade-mark seems to be
accorded little more protection than an invalid descriptive term. The Circuit C(qurt of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit said in Solventol Chemical Products, Inc. v. Langfield, 134
F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943) : "Such trade-marks may be valid but as to them, the
field is open to other traders to employ equally suggestive marks provided only that they
be not deceptively similar." Id. at 903. And the court charged the lower court with
having failed to give effect to the rule "that the adoption of a suggestive mark by one
trader, will not preclude any other trader from employing another mark of equal sug-
gestiveness. . . ." Ibid. If this view were universally accepted and not a rather iso-
lated expression of opinion by this court, trade-mark owners would be much better advised
not to select a suggestive trade-mark, no matter how ingenious, because its suggestive-
ness would detract from the scope of its protection rather than enhance it. See note 47
sup(ra.
72. 71 F. (2d) 515 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
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the mind as to what the term could mean and the two words used
in conjunction cease to be descriptive and become suggestive. Mature
thought would probably lead to but one conclusion-that a mouse
poison was indicated-but it requires thought to reach this con-
clusion. The words used together possess an element of incongruity
which make them unusual and unique and therefore, in our opinion,
a valid trade-mark." 73
If the test indicated by the court is correct, it is difficult to see why the
word "Specs" should not likewise have been held a valid suggestive mark.
It would seem to require just as much "mental operation" to discover the
descriptive meaning of the word "Specs" as applied to masks for fowls
as it would to realize the descriptiveness of the words "Chicken of the
Sea" or "Mouse Seed."
In the absence of a Supreme Court decision on this point the question
will remain controversial even if the Lanham Bill should become law.
Section 2 of the Bill makes no mention of suggestive terms; and in pro-
hibiting registration of "merely descriptive" terms the Bill in effect re-
codifies section 5 of the Act of 1905. To obtain registration of an origin-
ally descriptive term it would be necessary under the Act to prove that
the name has become distinctive under section 2(f) despite its original
descriptive significance.74
VIII.
Occasionally trade-mark owners try to obtain protection against all
entirely non-commercial use of their mark which, though it may cause
no pecuniary damage, may adversely affect the owner's or the product's
reputation. If there is any legal foundation for such action, it will prob-
ably be found in the field of trade libel 75 or possibly unfair competition
rather than in that of trade-mark infringement. The "moral right" doc-
trine recognized to some very small extent in copyright law 71 has never
73. Id. at 517.
74. The Court also denied certiorari in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Aetna Auto
Finance Co., 123 F. (2d) 582 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941), cert. denied, 315 U. S. 824 (1942).
The circuit court of appeals in a unanimous decision held in that case that the defendant
should be enjoined from using the name "Aetna Auto Finance Co." in view of the na-
tionwide reputation which the Aetna Insurance Company had built up in a related field.
The court found that the purpose of the defendant's appropriation of its corporate name
was "to project itself into that business arena panoplied in a name already favorably
known," id. at 584, and concluded that the case came within well-recognized principles
of the law of unfair competition.
75. Compare in regard to this problem, Wolff, Unfair Competition by Truthfil Dis-
parageuwnt (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1304.
76. Compare Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists,
Authors, and Creators (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 554.
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been applied to trade-mark law in the absence of a commercial trade-mark
use by the infringer. An interesting attempt was recently made in Caron
Corporation v. R. K. 0. Radio Pictures 77 to introduce "moral right" pro-
tection into the field of trade-mark law. There the manufacturer of a well-
known perfume, sold under the registered trade-mark "Fleurs de Rocaille,"
brought an action against R. K. O., alleging that the defendant had ob-
tained a set of dummy bottles from the plaintiff by fraudulent repre-
sentations and had used one of them in making a scene in a motion pic-
ture. The scene depicted "a squalid interior in a shack." In these sur-
roundings a depraved person in the presence of a confirmed drunkard
made a gift of petitioner's package to her mother. Such use of the trade-
mark in a motion picture, the plaintiff alleged, "is exclusively to the ad-
vantage of respondent and to the detriment of petitioner."
Both the New York Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme
Court refused to pass upon this question after the Appellate Division had
unanimously and without opinion affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
by the lower court. Even if the "moral right" doctrine were a part of
trade-mark law,7" it would require considerable imagination to charac-
terize the use of a trade-mark, under the circumstances described, as an
"infringement" and an actionable violation of the intangible interest of
the trade-mark owner in the preservation of the integrity of the mark.
The fact that in actual life or in a movie one of the most delicate perfumes
may be used by, or given as a present to, depraved women cannot reflect
upon the reputation of the perfume itself any more than the presence
of a painting by a famous artist in a house of ill repute would detract
from his reputation. The intrinsic merits of a work of art or of a luxury
77. The various decisions of the New York Supreme Court in this case are unre-
ported. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's dismissal of the complaint
without opinion. 264 App. Div. 763, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 715 (1st Dep't 1942), lcav to ap-
peal denied, 44 N. E. (2d) 422 (1942).
78. A first step toward recognition of a "moral right" in trade-marks may be found
in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 153 (1936).
In upholding state fair trade legislation, the court observed:
"We are here dealing not with a commodity alone, but with a commodity plus the
brand or trade-mark which it bears as evidence of its origin and of the qualit, of the
commodity for which the brand or trade-mark stands. Appellants own the commcdity;
they do not own the mark or the good-will that the mark symbolizes. And good-will is
property in a very real sense, injury to which, like injury to any other species of prop-
erty, is a proper subject for legislation. Good-will is a valuable contributing aid to busi-
ness-sometimes the most valuable contributing asset of the producer or distributor of
commodities. And distinctive trade-marks, labels and brands are legitimate aids to the
creation or enlargement of such good-will. It is well settled that the proprietor of the
good-will 'is entitled to protection as against one who attempts to deprive him of the
benefits resulting from the same, by using his labels and trade-mark without his con-
sent and authority.'" Id. at 194.
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article are not affected by the social standing of their owner or the owner's
physical surroundings.
Ix.
The sole recent case in which the Supreme Court has granted certiorari,
Green v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Company,7" involves an important
trade-mark issue only collaterally. The court of appeals in that case held,
inter alia, that defendant had no right to use the trade-mark "Premier" on
vacuum cleaners which he had reconditioned and reassembled even though
the parts used were genuine parts originally covered by the plaintiff's
patent. The court did not, however, enjoin defendant absolutely from
using the trade-mark "Premier" on the reconditioned cleaners although
the reasoning of the majority decision seemed to foreshadow such a rul-
ing. The defendant was enjoined only "from offering for sale or selling
reconditioned or reconstructed vacuum cleaners using plaintiff's trade-
marks Premier or Premier Duplex, or either of them, in the manner
which has been employed; but not if the reconditioned or reconstructed
vacuum cleaners [were] marked as prominently as the trademarks, to
indicate that the reconditioning or reconstruction was done by the ap-
pellant." 80
Unfortunately, the vital question concerning the scope of trade-mark
protection in cases of rebuilt and reconditioned articles will not conic
squarely before the Supreme Court in this case because the defendant has
limited his petition for certiorari to the patent and anti-trust issues in-
volved. The defendant petitioner has expressly stated in his petition that
"it waives any errors in enjoining him from hereafter selling recon-
ditioned cleaners unless they are labeled 'rebuilt by Green' and consents
to an order requiring such marking." 81
That the issue of reconditioning may at best come before the Court
only in a collateral way is doubly regrettable when it is recalled that less
than a year ago the Court had an opportunity but failed to decide this
question squarely in the case of Champion Spark Plug v. Reich.8 2 There
the court of appeals held that the purchaser of merchandise does not ac-
quire ownership of the trade-mark and may not sell the merchandise under
the original trade-mark after he has changed or altered the goods "so that
79. 132 F. (2d) 312 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942), cert. granted, 318 U. S. 753 (1943). The
petition for certiorari was subsequently withdrawn.
80. Id. at 315.
81. The Supreme Court had also been asked to determine to what extent the defend-
ant in a patent and trade-mark infringement action of this kind may be forced to disclose
the names of those from 'vhom he obtained both the patented and unpatented parts sub-
sequently sold by him in reconditioned form. With regard to the question of recondition-
ing in general, see Derenberg, The Sale of Reconditioned Articles as Trade-Mark In-
fringenent (1937) 32 T. M. BUL. 15.
82. 121 F. (2d) 769 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 669 (1941).
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they no longer represent the original character and excellence which the
trade-mark indicates." 83 The court observed that "to sell such altered
goods without removing the original trade-mark is equivalent to a sub-
stitution of the purchaser's goods for those of the manufacturer, and, if
unauthorized, is an infringement of the registered trade-mark." Conse-
quently, the defendant was enjoined from selling any repaired spark plugs
without first removing plaintiff's trade-mark.
X
The foregoing canvass of recent trade-mark cases in which the Supreme
Court denied review must leave a pessimistic note discouraging trade-
mark owners and attorneys from attempting to secure a hearing before
the Supreme Court. There are in many other fields instances in which
the law is progressively developed by "judicial legislation," and trade-mark
law, too, has in the past greatly benefited from judge-made law."4
In the Supreme Court's only recent decision on the subject of trade-
marks, M1r. Justice Frankfurter expressed the philosophy underlying
trade-mark protection as follows:
"The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition uf the
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by sym-
bols, it is no less trup that we purchase goods by them. A trade-
mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to
select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants.
The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making
every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the
drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means em-
ployed, the aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the
minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon
which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark uwner has
something of value. If another poaches upon the commercial mag-
netism of the symbol he has created, the owner can obtain legal re-
dress." 85
While the Supreme Court has thus taken full cognizance of the "com-
mercial magnetism" created by a trade-mark it seems at present that its
assurance of legal redress for infringement may remain an unfulfilled
promise until such time when the doors of the Court will be more widely
83. Id. at 773.
84. It is rather significant that in practically all the cases which form the subject of
this article, the lower court either denied relief to the trade-mark owner ("Coca-Cola'
"Brake Block," "Specs," "Life of Wheat," "Red Edge" fishing tackle, "Fleurs de RU-
caille") or denied registration to a mark which was claimed to qualify under the Act uf
1905 ("Texas Centennial," "Everybody's Weekly").
85. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Kresge Co., 316 U. S. 203, 205 (1942).
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and more frequently opened to review basic legal problems in the field of
trade-mark protection and unfair competition. 8 .
86. As this article goes to press, a petition for certiorari has been filed in one other
trade-mark case: Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren Ltd., (1943) 57 U. S. PAT. Q.
433, certiorari filed, Aug. 10, 1943. On the surface, this decision, like so many others dis-
cussed in this article, appears to raise no issue of trade-mark law or unfair competition
worthy of review by the Supreme Court, the only real issue being the alleged confusing
similarity between the designations "Chateau Martin" and "Chateau Montay" for wine.
The court of appeals in reversing the district court held that these two designations
were not confusingly similar and the petition for certiorari charges primarily error by
the court of appeals with regard to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, upon closer scrutiny, it will be noted that in the course of the majority
opinion Judge Jerome Frank took occasion to re-examine and restate the legal philosophy
underlying the law of unfair competition and trade-marks. Notwithstanding Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's assurance of legal redress to trade-mark owners, Judge Frank bluntly con-
cludes that the protection of the rights of trade-mark owners was "but a secondary and
limiting policy" and that the courts in the past had been "remarkably generous in fixing
the boundaries of such monopolies." "Today"-continues Judge Frank-"the tendency
is to be somewhat less generous."
"The failure to keep constantly in mind the divers policy considerations which,
in this legal province, come in conflict with one another and the consequent
occasional over-emphasis on but one of them-the protection of the interest of
the businessman who has built a business around a name-have sometimes led
to decisions unduly extending the confines of name-monopolies ... " Id. at
437.
The question may well be asked how this most recent pronouncement squares with the
recognition of the "commercial magnetism" inherent in a trade-mark and with Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes's classic statement in the Bourjois case, note 16 supra, that the trade-mark
monopoly "deals with a delicate matter that may be of great value but that is easily de-
stroyed, and therefore, should be protected with corresponding care." In the light of the
Supreme Court's present indifference toward trade-mark problems are we to assume that
our highest Court, too, considers the protection of trade-marks and trade names "a sec-
ondary and limiting policy" unduly extended in the past by "too generous" courts?
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